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Abstract For decades now, scholars have grappled with questions about how knowledge
producers can enhance the influence of their knowledge on users and improve policy
making. However, little attention has been paid to how policy experiments, a flexible and
ex ante method of policy appraisal, obtain influence over political decision-making. To
address this gap, an exploratory framework has been developed that facilitates systematic
analysis of multiple experiments, allowing hypotheses to be tested regarding how an
experiment’s institutional design can influence the views of political decision-makers.
Cash’s categories of effectiveness are used to describe an experiment’s conceptual influ-
ence; being how credible, salient, and legitimate decision-makers perceive an experiment
to be. The hypotheses are tested using 14 experiment cases found relevant to climate
adaptation in the Netherlands, with complete survey responses from over 70 respondents.
The results show that although, in general, the experiments had medium to high influence
on decision-makers, institutional design does have a noticeable impact. Organisers should
make choices carefully when designing an experiment, particularly in order to maintain
relevance during an experiment’s implementation and to build community acceptance.
Suggestions for future research include a comparison of experiment effects with the effects
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Introduction
With so many interests, analyses, and perspectives to be considered when developing
policy, how can a decision-maker feel confident about her selection of policy options? One
suggestion is to experiment, defined as a flexible, evidence-based approach to policy
making that is temporary and reversible (Tassey 2014). Taking an experimental approach
to governance forms the cornerstone of Campbell’s ‘‘Experimenting Society’’ where the
underlying premise is that policy-relevant knowledge must be created and critiqued using
ex ante evaluation and learning (Campbell 1998; see also: Lee 1999; Armitage et al. 2008).
In the policy sciences, discussion focuses on an experiment’s characteristics or suit-
ability for policy making, but empirical analyses of an experiment’s effects are uncommon.
Greenberg et al. (2003) conducted the most relevant comparative study when they analysed
the political impacts of five US social experiments. Millo and Lezaun (2006) also assessed
two regulatory experiments for their political impacts, and Farrelly and Brown (2011)
assessed how policy makers perceived the challenges and mechanisms of urban water
experiments. Each of these studies conceptualised experimentation and their impacts dif-
ferently, and only Greenberg et al. (2003) provided a list of factors said to improve the
likelihood that an experiment has an influence on policy decisions. Generally, scholarship
seldom challenges the foundational assumption that experimentation and learning improve
decision-making. It is this research gap we hope to address in this paper.
As an experiment is a venue where science and policy temporarily ‘‘engage in elaborate
and productive interplay’’ (Munaretto and Huitema 2012), an understanding of the influ-
ence of experimentation on politics can be improved if the focus is on the impact of
science–policy interfaces or policy appraisal and evaluation research. Here, empirical work
into the relationship between knowledge production and knowledge utilisation, or factors
that encourage or limit use of research findings, is more common (e.g. Weiss 1977; Cash
et al. 2003; Teirlinck et al. 2012; Koetz et al. 2012; Jordan and Russel 2014). Drawing on
these studies, this paper explores hypotheses about how policy experiments influence
decision-makers in their policy network.
Models of knowledge utilisation focus on either a conceptual or concrete influence on
decision-makers (Greenberg et al. 2003). This paper focuses on conceptual effects and
explores to what extent experiments make an impression on decision-makers and how
exploring the consequences of research other than its direct application (similar to Weiss’s
1977 analysis of enlightenment). Distinct criteria are used to gauge the effects policy
experiments have on decision-makers, including how credible, salient, or legitimate they
are perceived to be (Cash et al. 2003). Credibility reflects the perceived validity of evi-
dence and arguments, salience reflects the extent to which the experiment is seen to be
responsive to the needs of decision-makers, and legitimacy reflects the perception that the
process of producing information and technology has been respectful of stakeholders’
divergent values and beliefs, unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of views and
interests (Cash et al. 2003).
The research setting is the climate adaptation field. The inherent flexibility of experi-
mentation is expected to meet the needs of climate adaptation governance, which has been
defined by its uncertainties, controversies, and long-time frame (Massey and Huitema
2013). Experiments have the potential to provide evidence without fully committing to a
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particular policy action, which may reduce uncertainties and provides flexibility for
complexities that arise. The intention of this paper is not to explicitly evaluate these
characteristics, but to assess a group of 14 policy experiments (out of a longer list of 147
pilot cases) that provide evidence relevant to climate adaptation, all of which are situated
in the Netherlands, where adaptation is a national priority. To assess the experiments, the
policy sciences (e.g. Dryzek 1987; Owens et al. 2004; Sanderson 2009) and STS (e.g.
Pielke 2007) literature are used to distinguish between three types of experiment: the
technocratic, boundary, or advocacy experiment. These ideal types are theoretically con-
structed as aggregates of governance design choices that differ in the experiment types.
The hypotheses suppose that different experiment designs affect how effective experiments
are.
Using quantitative research methods in a multi-case study analysis, and drawing on the
literature cited above, this paper answers the research question: what is the relationship
between the governance design of a policy experiment and its influence on the policy
network? This question can be broken down into a set of sub-questions, which outline the
construction and subsequent testing of the hypotheses:
1. In what ways are political decision-makers influenced by policy experimentation?
2. To what extent does governance design explain how experiments influence political
decision-makers?
3. What are the implications of the findings on our understanding of how experiments are
used in policy making?
The paper is set out as follows. First, we summarise the different theoretical under-
standings of policy experimentation before positing a definition of the concept suitable for
environmental governance. Next, the dimensions used to measure effectiveness are set out
in ‘‘Analytical framework’’ section, which connects experiment design to conceptual
influence using hypotheses about how design choices affect the credibility, salience, and
legitimacy of the experiments. This is followed by an explanation of data collection and
survey methods used. Survey data are analysed to answer the first and second sub-question.
Finally, the main findings of and limitations to this research are discussed.
Policy experimentation: reforms on trial
One of the first scholars to promote the use of experiments for the betterment of society
was DT Campbell, who advocated for reliable policy reform using experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches in his ‘‘Experimenting Society’’ (Campbell 1969). Campbell was
not the first to recognise the value in experimentation for reform, as Dewey back in the
1920s considered democracy ‘‘inherently experimental’’ and policies could be ‘‘-experi-
mental in the sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped
observation of the consequences they entail…’’, which is somewhat consistent with
Campbell’s notions of exploring new ideas and testing them (Caspary 2000). Supported by
similar descriptors of policy development, for example, Lindblom’s (1959) piecemeal
implementation of policy in exploratory, incremental steps, the experimenting ideal gained
traction and during the following decades experimental interventions were conducted in an
attempt to improve economic, health, and education policy, particularly in (but not limited
to) the USA and UK (Greenberg et al. 2003). After some years, the appeal of policy
experiments diminished, due to the weakened belief in big government and rational
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planning (Sanderson 2009) but the concept has recently enjoyed a revival, particularly in
the realms of environmental governance, including adaptive management (Lee 1999),
transition management (Kemp et al. 1998), and climate governance (Hoffman 2011).
These fields understand an experiment as a project temporarily implemented on a
limited scale, which injects flexibility into the policy process (Tassey 2014). However, the
concept has otherwise stretched with use; in adaptive management, experimentation is
expected to provide reliable evidence of whether new management interventions work in
complex settings. In transition management, experiments are viewed favourably as niche
level projects that are used to diffuse an innovation on a wider scale. In climate gover-
nance, experiments are radical innovations, novel improvements that exist outside the
political status quo and seek to transform it (Casta´n Broto and Bulkeley 2013).1 Experi-
mentation has recently found a place in the policy innovations literature, where it has been
suggested experiments maintain an evaluative function while generating new, innovative
policy action (Jordan and Huitema 2014). Following this, a definition of a policy experi-
ment is constructed that captures these characteristics: ‘‘a temporary, controlled field-trial
of a policy-relevant innovation that produces evidence for subsequent policy decisions’’.
Ultimately, this definition underlines the assertion that the act of experimentation should be
explicit: without appraisal of the intervention’s effects, there is only demonstration of a
new initiative, and without innovation, only established ideas are being evaluated.
Various reasons actors choose to conduct an experiment are explored in the literature.
Experiments provide substantive evidence of how a proposed policy works in action
(Greenberg et al. 2003), but they also have many political uses. They can manipulate the
policy process by delaying decision-making, or exploit a window of opportunity and set the
policy agenda (Ibid.). Experimentation can bring a broader range of actors and ideas into
the policy process by creating ‘‘shadow networks’’ (Olsson et al. 2006), and experiments
can build acceptance amongst the local community, which helps us understand what is
‘‘appropriate’’ from their perspective (Greenberg et al. 2003; Millo and Lezaun 2006;
Sanderson 2009).
The next section introduces the framework used to assess the relationship between
experimentation and effectiveness. Two typologies are developed: one that stems from
science–policy evaluation and used to measure an experiment’s conceptual influence
(Greenberg et al. 2003; Cash et al. 2003), and one that posits three different experiment
designs as ‘‘ideal types’’ [in the sense of Weber (1968)]. Once the typologies are explained,
the hypotheses about their relationship are outlined.
Analytical framework
Measuring effectiveness
The examination of knowledge production and use in policy making revolves around a
number of themes. Venues used to produce knowledge for policy include expert advisory
bodies, parliamentary select committees, and policy appraisal settings (Jordan and Russel
2014), of which experiments and pilots are variants.2 Experiments as knowledge producers
1 Ansell and Bartenberger (2016) recently captured these different understandings with their typology of
controlled, Darwinian, and generative experiments.
2 Jordan and Turnpenny (2015) define policy formulation venues as: ‘‘institutional locations, both within
and outside governmental settings, in which policy formulation tasks are performed, with the aim of
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at the science–policy interface are expected to provide decision-makers with evidence of
the effects of a policy, which can have concrete or conceptual effects on its audience. In
this context, we focus on how an experiment influences a policy actor’s mind set, and a
conceptual utilisation process described as the gradual sedimentation of ideas into a policy
network (Weiss 1977). This focus contrasts with concrete utilisation, where research
findings are found to directly influence specific policy decisions (Greenberg et al. 2003)
(also known as the knowledge-driven model in Weiss 1977). Although understanding the
direct effects of knowledge on policy decisions is valuable, the number of interacting
variables to be considered means demonstrating any impact on actual decisions would be
difficult (Turnpenny et al. 2014). Measuring the perspectives of decision-makers, in con-
trast, is straightforward in comparison and broadens understanding of how experiments
influence policy making. Whether a decision-maker uses experimental evidence in their
decisions may depend on how favourably they perceive the experiment.
To assess conceptual influence, we draw on criteria regularly used to assess the
effectiveness of a science–policy interface—how credible, salient, and legitimate an
interface is perceived to be (Cash et al. 2003). The Cash typology is regularly used to
assess the science–policy interface and is similar to the criteria that Weiss (1977) used to
assess enlightenment experienced by decision-makers (being the perceived technical
quality, the relevance of research to policy, and the political acceptability of the research).
Credibility refers to the degree to which policy makers consider the experiment authori-
tative and believable, and to the degree in which they trust the outcomes. It includes
credibility of both the knowledge production processes and of the knowledge holders
(Saarki et al. 2014). Salience refers to the perceived relevance of the experiment by
decision-makers at a certain moment in time. It makes us aware of the relationship between
expert knowledge and decision-making, emphasising that credibility alone is not going to
improve political decisions (Cash et al. 2003). The third criterion is legitimacy, which
reflects the perception that the production of information has been respectful of stake-
holders’ divergent values and beliefs, unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of
views and interests. Legitimacy rests on how the choice was made to involve some actors
and not others, and how information was produced and disseminated (Ibid.). The three
criteria are summarised below (Table 1).
Typology of experiments
Studies have analysed experiments in terms of their characteristics (van der Heijden 2014),
purpose (Ettelt et al. 2015), and implications for policy (Greenberg et al. 2003). Here,
experiments are assessed in terms of how the organiser ‘‘sets’’ the experiment’s institu-
tional rules, as described in the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
developed by Elinor Ostrom (2005). Ostrom uses the rules to describe an action situation,
and they determine who is involved and who is excluded (boundary rules), how respon-
sibilities are distributed (choice rules), what types of information are distributed, how
regularly, and to whom (information rules), the extent of buy-in by participants (pay-off
rules), and how decisions are made (aggregation rules).
How these rules are set can be understood as design choices made by an experiment’s
organiser. To facilitate empirical investigation, differences in the settings of each of the
Footnote 2 continued




rules can be aggregated into three different types of experiment: technocratic, boundary,
and advocacy types. Real-world examples can then be approximated against these types
(Weber 1968; Dryzek 1987). Typical diametric technocratic and interpretive approaches to
policy analysis (Owens et al. 2004) provide a basis for distinguishing such types. The
typology is also informed by a model of the science–policy interface that classifies dif-
ferent roles of science (Pielke Jr. 2007): science as arbiter, issue advocate, or an honest
broker of policy options. The sections below summarise the rule settings for each ideal
type (rule settings for each experiment type are given in detail in ‘‘Appendix 1’’).
Technocratic experiment
The technocratic policy experiment resembles the technical–rational model of knowledge
production, where an expert elite generates scientific knowledge for policy decisions
(Owens et al. 2004). It produces scientific information with little or no connection to the
policy process until the end, when the results are presented to decision-makers. The
experiment thus plays a supposedly objective and disconnected role in politics as ‘‘science
arbiter’’ (Pielke Jr. 2007). Knowledge is produced and verified through processes
acceptable to the involved scientific community, with fact finding occurring within the
parameters of the goals previously set. This arrangement reinforces the view that science is
independent of politics (Koetz et al. 2012).
Boundary experiment
A boundary policy experiment provides an opportunity for actors—state and non-state—to
gain access to and possibly influence policy making. The boundary experiment is initiated
by a collaboration of actors, and the production of scientific knowledge is supplemented by
multiple knowledge systems—relevant contextual, lay, and traditional forms of knowl-
edge, which are considered of value (Koetz et al. 2012). The experiment’s role in policy
making resembles the ‘‘honest broker of policy alternatives’’ (Pielke 2007), where it
engages with the policy process and develops policy solutions in accordance with multiple
value perspectives. It is expected that the engagement results in participants appreciating
the different ways the problem can be understood, and in turn designing and testing a
mutually beneficial solution (Lejano and Ingram 2009).
Advocacy experiment
By choosing to design their experiment as an advocacy type, an organiser indicates that
they have a predefined problem definition and are not open to alternative interpretations.
They intend to use the experiment to encourage action in a particular policy direction and
to soften objections (compare the ‘‘(stealth) advocate’’ role in Pielke 2007). An advocacy




Credible Authoritative, of high quality, with trustworthy outcomes
Salient Relevant to policy at a certain moment in time




experiment is generally organised by policy makers and includes dominant, traditional
actors in coalition. Different actor types might be represented, but they agree with the
problem conception and those with contrasting expectations (‘‘outsiders’’) are barred from
gaining access (Owens et al. 2004). Those in charge retain power and control over design,
monitoring, and evaluation procedures, reinforcing the existing structures of power.
To summarise, the three experiment types each represent an aggregate of different rule
settings with divergent configurations of information, power distributions, and participants.
Individual rule settings could be analysed as independent variables in themselves, but it is not
the focus of this analysis (see Leach et al. 2014 for an assessment of how individual design
variables affect learning outcomes). The following section outlines how the (conceptually
derived) expectations of how the types might produce different effects on decision-makers.
Experiment design and effectiveness
The literature suggests several factors that could influence credibility, saliency, and
legitimacy. Based on these factors, three hypotheses are built that connect the design of
experiments to these criteria.
H1 If an experiment has a technocratic design, it will be considered highly credible and
moderately legitimate, but not salient.
For the technocratic type, due to its emphasis on independent scientific methods and
expertise the experiment is expected to be considered highly credible (Cash et al. 2003;
Owens et al. 2004). These experiments maintain a transparent process and reporting of
scientific findings—including uncertainties and limitations, which also boosts credibility
(Saarki et al. 2014). Separating the participants (expert actors) from policy makers and
excluding discussion on different perspectives means, the experiment is less likely to
resonate with the needs of policy makers, reducing the possibility of the project being
considered salient. The funding for the experiment is likely to be from organisations with a
purely scientific interest, which care more about scientific publications than about policy
relevance. Finally, the closed character of the technocratic type reduces its legitimacy
because the research question, data gathering process, and report writing have not involved
stakeholder groups or ordinary citizens and might not address arguments they consider
important (Millo and Lezaun 2006); however, this loss of legitimacy is tempered by the
experiment’s openness and transparency.
H2 If an experiment has a boundary design, it will be considered highly legitimate yet
moderately credible and salient.
In a boundary experiment, wide boundary settings ensure that non-state actors have access
to policy making where they can influence how a public policy problem is solved (Dryzek
1987). This may result in the experiment being perceived as very legitimate, as the inclusion
of different perspectives increases the chance that the evidence resonates with societal needs
(Hegger et al. 2012). Boundary experiments are the only type that allow actors to enter the
process on their own volition, which improves their legitimacy compared to the other two
types. Moreover, open and transparent information transmission between participants allows
for the ‘‘extended peer review’’ of the experiment by a range of actors (Funtowicz andRavetz,
1993), rendering the information producedmore legitimate (Ibid.). The inclusion of different
knowledge types will distract from the independent and reliable knowledge produced, so a
lower perception of credibility than for the technocratic type is expected. Including a range of
actors may ensure salience, although increased inclusiveness can have negative effects
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because it may mean issues are reframed that make an experiment irrelevant (Cash et al.
2003). Nevertheless, a boundary experiment will strengthen linkages between knowledge
production and users and increase the probability that the experiment will be designed around
the best question for policy (Saarki et al. 2014).
H3 If an experiment has an advocacy design, it will be considered highly salient but not
very credible or legitimate.
Finally, in regard to the expected impacts of an advocacy experiment, credibility is
undermined by including policy and non-state actors in the experiment along with expert
actors, which dilutes the validity of scientific knowledge with the production of practical
knowledge. Moreover, if it is noticed, selective information distribution and a lack of
transparency reduce the experiment’s perceived reliability. In the attempt to show there is
support for a particular proposal, the organiser blocks participation by critical actors and
thereby undermines their concerns, reducing fairness and the perceived legitimacy of the
project. However, salience may be high because of the presence of dominant policy actors,
which helps when the experiment is used to keep a policy idea alive (Greenberg et al.
2003), and outcomes are presented when the time is right—carefully gauged and engi-
neered by the policy actors involved.
Table 2 summarises the expectations sketched above into three tentative hypotheses.
Intervening variables
Our independent variable (governance design choices made by experiment organisers) is
only one possible way to explain variations in an experiment’s effectiveness. There are
competing explanations that may explain their impact; for example, what role (if any) the
respondent’s organisation had in the experiment. Other relevant factors include what
government institution they work for, or the extent they consider the experiment innovative
(Weiss 1977). Playing one of these roles might positively bias a decision-maker’s survey
responses. These variables are also operationalised and examined in the analysis below.
Other intervening variables include the extent of change in the political environment
external to the experiment and environmental crises such as flooding events or drought, but
these external changes were not controlled for.
Data and methods
Case selection
Based on the definition of policy experiment posited earlier, five criteria were used to
isolate experiment cases related to adaptation from a broader set of 147 innovative pilot
Table 2 Expected scores for the three types
Credible Salient Legitimate
H1: technocratic type High Low Medium
H2: boundary type Medium Medium High
H3: advocacy type Low Medium/high Low
The categories relate to the 1–5 scale used for measuring experiment effects: high C4; middle = 3–4; low
B3 (the questions were answered on a scale ranging from: (1) no certainly not; (2) not really; (3) neutral; (4)
somewhat; and (5) certainly)
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cases3 conducted in the Dutch environment sector. Table 3 below sets out the criteria:
whether the project was testing for effects; whether it was innovative with uncertain
outcomes; whether it had policy relevance; whether there was state involvement; and
whether it was relevant to climate adaptation. Eighteen cases met all five criteria.4
The 18 experiment cases dealt with a range of issues in climate adaptation: from safety
against sea-level rise, increased precipitation, water variability, drought, and saltwater
intrusion. Climate adaptation is an emerging policy field, and it is notable that most
experiments sampled relate to the distribution and quality of water. The cases demonstrate
how the Netherlands are taking broader adaptation-related responses—such as land use
planning and agriculture—and coupling them to water concerns, e.g. multifunctional land
use; private responsibility being taken for the amount of water used (Wolsink 2010).5 Ten
experiments tested technical innovations (the application of a technical solution on the
ecological system to measure its impacts); four experiments tested governance innovations
(the application of a governance solution on the social and ecological system); and four
experiments trialled both (see ‘‘Appendix 2’’). The governance innovations tended to be
boundary or technocratic experiments, and the combined governance/technical innovations
tended to be advocacy experiments. Most technical innovations were technocratic or
advocacy experiments. The textbox below summarises one of the experiment cases, De
Kerf.6
De Kerf Coastal Management Experiment (1997–2003)
This experiment was conducted from 1997 to 2003 and examined the implications of dynamic coastal
management in the Dutch province of North Holland. The experiment involved cutting through the fore-
dune coastal defence to test the possibility of maintaining a defence while letting natural processes restore
the dune areas and maintaining ecological values inside the dunes. This required a change in thinking from
an exclusive focus on safety to a broader approach that linked safety objectives with nature objectives and
recreation, without compromising safety. ‘‘Dynamic coastal management’’ was an innovation in thinking
about coastal management in 1990s policy documents from the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and
Water Management (V&W, 1990) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV, 1990).
The experiment achieved its goals but monitoring of effects was halted by budget cuts. The results had an
impact on the ‘‘New Delta!’’ EU programme, and the innovation was adopted as policy in ‘‘de Derde
kustnota’’ (third Coastal note)
3 For 9 months in 2013, two people searched for cases using phrases such as test pilots, innovation, ex-
periment, proef, onderzoek, and pilot, on programme websites, ministry, province and water authority
websites, and in scoping interviews. Projects that were deemed irrelevant included product testing, concept
pilots, modelling projects, and reapplications of the initial experiment.
4 The cases have different spatial and temporal scales and deal with different problems; however, they are
comparable due to their meeting the stringent conditions. The start dates of the experiments range between
1997 and January 2013, and seven are ongoing as of June 2015. Cases were included if they have had at least
2 years’ implementation or an interim evaluation (following Van der Heijden 2015). Experiment names are
not used here to honour confidentiality agreements with participants.
5 Examples of innovative policy concepts being tested include multifunctional land use, which combines
flood reduction and nature management; dynamic coastal management and building with nature, which use
natural processes to reduce flood risk; and water husbandry, which encourages farmers to close the water






This research measured the effect of each experiment on its surrounding ‘‘policy network’’,
which is defined as the public institutions that govern the geographical context of each
experiment: the municipality, the water authority, the province, and the ministerial level
(where appropriate). A desktop search was conducted to compile lists of all the ‘‘decision-
makers’’—council members and heads of policy departments (relevant to environmental
policy) in each state organisation. A list of these actors from each relevant state organi-
sation was compiled for 17 experiments, with an average of 121 people per case (each
experiment is situated in a municipality, a province, and a water board). One experiment
was omitted due to its being a nationwide experiment. Three experiment cases were
located in the same municipality, so the total sample population was 1694.7
Council members with portfolios relating to environmental issues were chosen first;
then, the remaining decision-makers were listed alphabetically, and every fourth name was
chosen from each institution to create a list of 30 people per experiment8 (stratified random
sampling). In October and November 2014, an online survey (using the platform ‘‘Survey
Monkey’’) was emailed to the identified people (510 individuals). To encourage partici-
pation and prove legitimacy of the survey, an endorsement from the President of the Dutch
Union of Water Authorities, Mr. Peter Glas, introduced the survey email.
Survey design
The survey first asked decision-makers whether they had heard of the experiment con-
ducted in their area. If they had not, they were directed to the end of the survey. If they
Table 3 Criteria and associated indicators used to identify policy experiments in climate change adaptation
in the Netherlands
Criteria Indicators Relevance to definition
Testing for real-
world effects




Innovation Previously untried policy or management practice Innovative intervention
with uncertain outcomes
Policy relevance Test of policy concept or approach Produces evidence for
policy decisions
State involvement Organiser or other participatory role played by an actor
employed by state or state agency
Ecosystem
response




Exploring new policy concepts to manage sea-level rise,
flooding, freshwater availability, and increased drought
7 Fourteen experiment cases were multiplied by 121, instead of 17, as three were located in the same
municipality and therefore had the same list of decision-makers.
8 This sampling was done by arranging the names from each institution in alphabetical order and choosing
every third person. Each person (N = 510) was then emailed the survey link. If, after prompting, there were
too few responses, then a second list of people was compiled. The initial email was followed by two
reminders. A minimum of four full responses for each case was considered sufficient.
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responded yes, the respondents were then asked seven questions to assess credibility (e.g.
their perception of data quality, trust in the experts, and standard of the conclusions); nine
questions to determine salience (e.g. whether the questions asked were relevant to policy
makers’ needs and whether the evidence created an opportunity to renew policy); and five
questions to assess legitimacy (e.g. whether the experiment included all relevant parties
from the area and whether the goals of the experiment were in line with community
values). The effectiveness variables were measured as ordinal variables, and ‘‘Appendix 4’’
lists the full set of questions (translated from Dutch). For each experiment, the answers
were then given a total score for the three criteria.
Control questions in the survey asked what institutional affiliation the respondents had
and whether they were involved personally in the experiment. The respondents were also
asked whether their organisation played a role in the experiment, including initiator
(N = 24), funder (N = 24), stakeholder (N = 60), interested party (N = 31), or knowl-
edge broker (N = 15).9 Data were also collected on whether respondents were involved in
deciding whether to conduct the experiment, and whether they thought the experiment was
innovative.
Data analysis
The survey results were analysed using statistical data-analysis software (SPSS 21). Basic
descriptive statistics (frequency tables, cross-tabulations) are used to ascertain impact
scores, ANOVA (analysis of variance) tests are used to assess whether there are significant
differences in scores between ideal types,10 and Kruskal–Wallis tests are used to assess
differences in the questions used to assess each variable. The decision to use both para-
metric and nonparametric tests depended on the normal distribution of the data, which was
normal for the aggregated data and not normal for the individual questions (see ‘‘Ap-
pendices 4, 5’’).
We received 164 responses from the 510 survey requests, which is a response rate of
32.2%. Ninety-six of those who responded (59%) had heard of the experiment conducted in
their area. However, the number of fully completed surveys (where answers are given for
over half of the questions for each variable) reduces the number of useable surveys to
N = 74. ‘‘Appendix 3’’ displays these numbers per experiment and also notes the
respondents’ institutions for each case: municipality (responded in 10 cases); water
authority (16); province (10); ministry (3), showing that the range of institutional response
was broad. The ministry respondents were decision-makers at the Department for
Waterways and Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat) at the Ministry of Infrastructure and
Environment, and they were included if this institution was involved in a case.11 Table 4
shows that water authorities were most heavily represented, possibly because of the
endorsement by their president and because other institutions find the issues less relevant to
their general agenda.
9 This question was not compulsory and more than one answer was possible.
10 Here we use ANOVA in line with established practice for measuring the means amongst three or more
variables.
11 The decision to only include RWS decision-makers if the organisation was involved in the experiment
was based on the observation that although RWS have regional offices, they are staffed by only a few





In this section, the survey results are presented and analysed. After a general summary,
results relevant to the hypotheses are explored in turn. This is followed by an assessment of
the intervening factors and how they relate to the three impact criteria. Out of the 18 cases,
four were omitted,12 so the analysis rests on 14 experiments. An assessment of the 14 cases
(see ‘‘Appendix 1’’) found that five experiments met the technocratic definition (N = 24
complete responses from decision-makers), three were boundary experiments (N = 15),
and six were advocacy experiments (N = 35). Experiment type is a nominal, dichotomous
variable.
Results for whole sample
Table 5 summarises the scores for each criterion used to measure impact. Credibility
scored highest with 4.2, legitimacy scored 3.8, and salience had the lowest score of 3.6. No
criterion scored ‘‘low’’ (under 3), indicating that the experiments were generally well
regarded. Reliability of aggregating the questions into variables was determined by
computing Cronbach’s alpha (a) for each set of questions. The questions assessing all three
criteria scored well over the .7 needed to justify the aggregation (De Vaus 2002). To
determine whether the variables differed across the ideal types, an ANOVA test was
performed (Table 6). It revealed significant scores when the responses for each criterion
were divided up into types. This result adds weight to the assumption that a difference in
scores is attributable to design.13
Next, the hypothesis of each ideal type is assessed. The aggregated score is presented,
but to gain deeper understanding of how the experiments were perceived some of the
individual questions are also analysed, particularly those that had answers that showed
significant differences between the types (visual representations of how the ideal types
differed across each variable are found in ‘‘Appendix 4’’).
Table 4 Extent of responses from individual institutions
Institution # responses Percent knew case Per cent completed survey
Municipality 37 (23%) 57 36
Water Authority 68 (42%) 72 66
Province 54 (33%) 43 38
Ministry 4 (2%) 100 50
Total 163a 62 47.5
a Three respondents did not give their institutional affiliation
12 One experiment was omitted due to it being a national experiment and therefore relevant to all insti-
tutions throughout the country, making the collection of survey data from all relevant decision-makers
overly time-consuming. Another case was removed from the group because of a lack of responses. Two
further cases were also removed because, despite a high number of responses, these political actors had not
heard of the experiment in their jurisdiction (see ‘‘Appendix 3’’).
13 See ‘‘Appendix 5’’ for homogeneity of variances test and a Tukey post hoc test.
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Differences in conceptual influence between the ideal types
Technocratic experiments
Recalling the hypothesis set out in Table 1 (repeated in Table 7 below), technocratic
experiments are expected to be considered highly credible, somewhat legitimate, and only
slightly salient. From the survey, technocratic-type experiments recorded medium levels
for each variable, so expectations were met for legitimacy but not met for salience or
credibility. Technocratic experiments score slightly lower than expected for credibility and
.3 below the mean. Their aggregated score for credibility was significantly lower than that
for boundary experiments. Technocratic experiments were seen to ask more ambiguous
questions, and confidence in the experts involved was lower than both boundary and
advocacy experiments (although the mean score is still high).
Technocratic experiments earned a low–medium score for salience, also .3 below the
mean. This is slightly higher than the anticipated low score, although significantly lower
than advocacy experiments. In particular, technocratic experiments were seen to be





Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Cronbach’s
alpha
Credibility* 74 2 5 4.2 .64 a = .92
Salience* 74 2 5 3.6 .6 a = .84
Legitimacy* 74 1 5 3.8 .76 a = .88
Cronbach’s alpha scores signify the reliability of aggregating the survey questions into the variables
(a = .70 is the minimum acceptable score)
* Whether there were significantly different scores between the ideal types
Table 6 ANOVA test results for significance between the ideal types
ANOVA
Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig.
Credibility
Between groups 2.973 2 1.487 3.920 .025
Within groups 25.028 66 .379
Total 28.001 68
Salience
Between groups 3.674 2 1.837 6.170 .003
Within groups 20.242 68 .298
Total 23.916 70
Legitimacy
Between groups 5.336 2 2.668 5.156 .008




primarily linked to expert interests (and not policy interests) more than the other types.
Their questions were considered more likely to lose relevance to policy makers over time,
and their results less convertible into policy. Technocratic experiment scored medium for
legitimacy, confirming the hypothesis. On all five questions, the technocratic experiments
did well, although still significantly lower than boundary experiments, particularly in
reference to the degree of openness afforded by the experiment.
Boundary experiments
Boundary experiments were estimated to be highly legitimate and somewhat credible and
salient, and they met two of the hypothesised scores because they scored higher for
credibility than expected (Table 8). The high credibility score was a surprise (being .3
above the mean) with all seven questions being given high scores (see ‘‘Appendix 4’’). As
noted above, boundary experiments were considered significantly more credible than
technocratic experiments. The salience score was quite a bit lower but still met the
hypothesis. Boundary experiments were seen to produce results more convertible to policy
than the others, and they were most successful at communicating their results, so that
policy makers can utilise them.
As expected, boundary experiments excelled in legitimacy. Here, they scored .5 higher
than the average and scored high on four of the five measured factors, with the highest
score being for most strongly reflecting the views and priorities of people living in the
surrounding area where the experiments were embedded.
Advocacy experiments
Finally, advocacy experiments were expected to be considered highly salient and only
slightly credible and legitimate (the hypothesis is repeated in Table 9). The results show
that the assumptions made were wrong for all three criteria. Advocacy experiments were
Table 7 Results for technocratic experiments across the three effectiveness criteria
Technocratic experiment (N = 24) Credibility* Salience Legitimacy
Expectation High ([4) Low (\3) Medium (3–4)
Results 3.9 7 3.3 7 3.5 4
Sample mean 4.2 3.6 3.8
* Significance for this criterion in comparison with the other types
Table 8 Results for boundary experiments across the three effectiveness criteria
Boundary (N = 15) Credibility* Salience Legitimacy*
Expectation Medium (3–4) Medium/high (3.5–4) High ([4)
Results 4.5 7 3.7 4 4.3 4
Sample mean 4.2 3.6 3.8
* Significance for this criterion in comparison with the other types
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expected to have low credibility but received a high score that equalled the mean. The
highest score related to the perceived reliability of the organisers.
Salience was expected to be high, and although the advocacy experiments scored higher
than the mean for this criterion, it was not as high as expected. Nevertheless, the questions
posed by advocacy experiments were seen as more relevant than either boundary or
technocratic experiments (‘‘Appendix 4’’). They scored lowest for their communication of
results, which were judged as unfamiliar to policy makers’ experiences, but all types
scored poorly on this aspect of salience. Advocacy experiments were expected to not be
seen as particularly legitimate, and here they perform much better than assumed. All the
questions received medium scores, and they did better than the technocratic experiments.
Relevance of the intervening variables
The ANOVA tests demonstrated that experiment type had an effect on the scores for
credibility, salience, and legitimacy. However, other intervening explanations might also
be relevant. These variables included what kind of organisation the respondent worked for
(municipality, province, water authority) and what sort of role the respondent’s organi-
sation had in the experiment (initiator, financier, stakeholder, knowledge provider). The
influence of these variables was examined with a series of Mann–Whitney U tests (as they
did not all meet the normal distribution assumption). In addition, based on Weiss’s finding
that innovative research carried greater, more favourable weight amongst decision-makers
(Weiss 1977), the extent to which respondents thought the experiment was innovative14
and whether this would have an effect on their scoring of an experiment was tested.
The results showed that a decision-maker from an organisation that initiated an
experiment was significantly more likely to evaluate an experiment more positively for all
three variables and that a respondent from an organisation that funded an experiment was
more likely to evaluate the experiment as credible. For the other roles a respondent’s
organisation might have had (stakeholder, knowledge provider) the respondents did not
vary significantly in scores. In terms of what organisation a respondent worked for, no
significant differences were found. Unfortunately, the innovation data violated assumptions
required for ANCOVA (the statistical test used to assess the effects of a covariate in an
ANOVA test) so the variable was separately examined using a Spearman rho correlation
analysis. The test revealed that there was a moderate correlation between innovation and
credibility (r = .576), weak correlation with salience (r = .340), and a moderate corre-
lation with legitimacy (r = .619). This implies some corroboration for Weiss’s hypothesis,
in the sense that the more an experiment is considered innovative, the higher its credibility
and legitimacy.
Table 9 Results for advocacy experiments across the three effectiveness criteria
Advocacy (N = 35) Credibility Salience* Legitimacy
Expectation Low (\3) High ([4) Low (\3)
Results 4.2 7 3.8 7 3.9 7
Sample mean 4.2 3.6 3.8
* Significance for this criterion in comparison with the other types




The purpose of this paper was to gain a better understanding of the relationship between
the design of a policy experiment and its impact on the policy network, which was
measured by assessing a decision-maker’s perception of how credible, salient, and legit-
imate they believed an experiment to be. Encouraged by Weiss (1977) and Greenberg et al.
(2003), we assessed the conceptual influence of an experiment on decision-makers to
develop alternative insights into the use of knowledge in decision-making, which go
beyond the more regular assessment of the direct use of an experiment’s results. The
research questions outlined in the introduction are now discussed in turn, followed by an
assessment of the limits to the analysis and future research suggestions.
Regarding question one, results of the survey confirm that decision-makers are generally
aware of and hold favourable impressions of policy experiments. This finding should buoy
advocates who value the novel, innovative aspects of experimenting for policy develop-
ment. However, our focus on conceptual influence does not enhance our understanding of
whether experiments directly influence policy decisions, and the literature is not very
positive: Greenberg et al. (2003) found no indication that the effects of the evaluated
experiment cases had been decisive in the decision to adopt a tested policy. Rather,
political reasons were given precedence over experiment evidence. Thus, the question of
whether experimenting is worth the time and money is still open to debate.
Our second question asked whether an experiment’s governance design affects per-
ceived levels of credibility, salience, and legitimacy of experiments, and we suggested
hypotheses for each experiment type. Hypothesis H1 (technocratic experiments) was
partially rejected, with only the legitimacy score being predicted correctly; H2 was par-
tially accepted with our salience and legitimacy scores being correct; and H3 was rejected
outright because all three effect variables scored differently to predictions.
The analysis shows that, although we predicted over half the relationships incorrectly,
most differences in impact scores can be explained by design, particularly the differences
between technocratic experiment scores and the other two types. An elitist design is least
effective, with a surprisingly medium score for credibility. To decision-makers, isolating
experts from policy and limiting inclusion makes an experiment less credible, not more.
This critical perception of technocratic experiments reflects the rejection of the ‘‘scien-
tification’’ of politics, as they generated the least trust in their experts and questions were
considered the least clear. These results also highlight an evolution in the literature. At its
inception, credible evidence was defined as the perceived scientific adequacy of a science–
policy interface’s technical evidence and arguments (Cash et al. 2003). Generalisable,
scientific knowledge was considered most plausible and accurate. However, during its
theoretical development, credibility has essentially been broadened to include place-based
knowledge in science (e.g. Hegger et al. 2012). Our results show, for experiments at least,
that when a broad set of actors contribute contextual, practical knowledge, this place-based
knowledge improves credibility over scientifically defensible knowledge alone (even with
a lack of transparency and poor information distribution between the participants, as found
in advocacy experiments).
Another interesting observation is the extent advocacy experiments scored surprisingly
well on all three impact variables, particularly legitimacy. This may be because all the
advocacy experiments were sited in relatively harmonious contexts, where no critical
actors were excluded nor objections voiced about the incumbent power structures. Deci-
sion-makers would only know actors in their area were disaffected if anyone actually
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protested about it. We tentatively suggest that an advocacy design reduces an experiment’s
perceived legitimacy only if it is used to test policy options in conflict settings, where other
actors oppose the proffered solution.
The third question asked what the implications of the findings are on our understanding
of how experiments are used in policy making. The uses noted earlier: to produce evidence,
build acceptability, and push/maintain ideas on the policy agenda can all be seen reflected
here. Strong credibility illustrates that decision-makers value the way evidence is pro-
duced; we have not measured whether they apply the evidence to their own decisions, but
we can extrapolate from the findings that experiments are generally seen to produce useful
and valid information. A medium score for salience reveals that experiments are perhaps
vulnerable to political machinations; the length of time it takes to conduct them means they
can lose visibility easily and risk becoming a ‘‘time capsule’’ (Sanderson 2002). Organisers
must work hard to keep the issue on the political agenda and maintain relevance
(Greenberg et al. 2003). Finally, a medium–high score for legitimacy indicates that
experiments can play a strong role in ‘‘softening’’ a community’s stance on change, par-
ticularly if a boundary design is used that provides non-state actors with access to the
process and gives them some control over it.
In regard to research limitations, systematic survey sampling has its strengths as well as
its drawbacks. Setting the minimum at seven responses when 40 people are initially
sampled is low and limits the findings; however, due to the difficulty in accessing decision-
makers at this level and in these numbers, the results validly increase understanding of to
what extent political decision-makers value experiments. Randomly choosing respondents
also strengthens the findings for each experiment, although we note the unintended bias
towards respondents from the water authorities, perhaps due to the endorsement letter from
their chairman, and lack of responses from ministry officials. An in-depth qualitative
analysis of a selection of these experiments could explore the broad patterns we identified
here more thoroughly and avoid these unfortunate biases.
It was surprising that somany peoplewho initially responded to the survey (almost half) had
never heardof the projects. The surveyparticipantswere randomly chosen, but decision-makers
with environmental portfolios were targeted first, which indicates that experiments are being
conducted in jurisdictions where relevant decision-makers are not aware of them. This insight
could translate into an interesting research question for scholars interested in experiments:
building onGreenberg et al. (2003), what strategies should experiment organisers use to ensure
an experiment’s visibility and influence? As noted above, we did not control for some extra-
neous variables; for example, the extent that a political change or external event could influence
how salient an experiment is. If a government that championed a policy innovation is replaced
by one that is ambivalent or even hostile towards the change, an experiment could quickly lose
visibility and relevance; similarly, if a catastrophic environmental event like a flood or earth-
quake occurred, then this could push the experiment into the spotlight as a symbol of what’s
‘‘being done’’ to manage the disaster. How important these events are to the success of an
experiment could be another question for further research.
Scholars might also analyse differences between the effectiveness of an experiment and
other policy appraisal venues, such as pilots or cost–benefit analyses; or how different
individual rule settings influence an experiment’s effectiveness. A fourth research path
could look to establish whether the ideal type designs could fit particular problem contexts,
i.e. as mentioned above that advocacy experiments may maintain legitimacy in more
harmonious contexts. This resonates with a discussion in Owens et al. (2004) on the choice
of different policy appraisal designs being contingent on a continuum from well-structured
problems to severely unstructured ones.
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To conclude, the analysis reveals that, on the whole, policy experiments have a positive
effect on their relevant policy network. In general, they are seen to be of good quality and
produce results that are very credible, moderately salient, and moderately legitimate. That
decision-makers find the process of experimentation a largely positive endeavour is a
useful finding, but the research exposes the fact experiments are only rarely used to invent
and evaluate new policy strategies.15 The literature agrees: as a method of developing new
policy approaches generally, experimentation is uncommon (Gunderson 1999). If gov-
ernments do attempt institutional reform, the evaluation of outcomes is lacking (Campbell
1998) or innovation may go undetected, with policy change mostly occurring incremen-
tally within existing programmes where the degree of uncertainty is low (Vedung 1997;
Campbell 1998). It is noted from the scoping interviews with initiators that the cost and the
uncertainty of risk make it hard for policy makers to accept that political failure is an
option (a phenomenon explored by Hood 2007). They stressed the importance of building
political and public support for the project before it even enters the experiment phase (a
factor not captured in the framework) and being explicit in the fact that if the experiment
fails, the costs will be borne by the state. On one hand, it makes sense that policy actors are
cautious about innovating and taking risks, since they are spending public money. On the
other, the costs of maintaining the status quo may eventually outweigh the costs of trying
new ways to keep society’s proverbial head above water. Our results should support and
inspire actors who want to use experimentation as a method to assess their future
innovations.
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Appendix 1
Based on data from an earlier survey, each case was individually assessed using 15
indicators and subsequently assigned an ideal type. The indicators were developed based
on the institutional rules as proposed by Ostrom (2005). Each indicator has three settings,
one for each ideal type. The indicators and their specific rule settings are shown below. In
order to categorise each experiment, the cases were assessed against each indicator based
on a predetermined setting for each type. For each case, out of the 15 indicators one ideal
type setting emerged as the most dominant. The case was then labelled that ideal type. For
example, out of 15 indicators, experiment 2 scored one for technocratic, nine for boundary,
and five for advocacy; thus, it was classified as a boundary experiment. One ideal type
emerged as the dominant type for each case although it was uncommon for experiments to
have all 15 indicators the same for one type.
15 It is worth reiterating that out of 147 relevant pilots in our inventory, only 18 were deemed experiments
according to the definition.
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Expert actors Those with local
and/or expert
knowledge




Position Initiator role Expert actors Collaborators Policy actors
Use of facilitator None Yes (and neutral) If yes, then with/for
core members only
Information Contribution to goals None—already set
by policy makers




No Yes, to a large
degree
Yes, but not solely
Scientific knowledge
acknowledged/accepted





















Choice Authority at decision
nodes
Expert initiators Participants share
power
Policy initiators




Most actors have no
authority
Pay-off How costs distributed Minimal buy-in Buy-in No buy-in












a cf. Ostrom (2005)
Appendix 2
Breakdown of experiment case into policy issues and solutions, followed by two examples
Exp. Policy issue/type of problem (New) policy concept/how tested
Exp 1 Coastal management/sea-level rise Building with nature. Technical innovation
Exp 2 Coastal management/sea-level rise Building with nature. Technical innovation




Exp. Policy issue/type of problem (New) policy concept/how tested
Exp 4 Freshwater availability/decline in freshwater
availability
Shared responsibility. Technical and
governance innovation (control site)
Exp 5 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Multifunctional land use/shared
responsibility. Technical and governance
innovation




Exp 7 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Shared responsibility. Technical and
governance innovation
Exp 8 Water variability Saltwater–freshwater transitions.
Governance innovation
Exp 9 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Multifunctional land use. Technical
innovation
Exp 10 Coastal management/sea-level rise Climate buffers. Technical innovation
Exp 11 Coastal management/sea-level rise Dynamic coastal management. Technical
innovation
Exp 12 Dike management/river-level rise Pest management. Governance innovation
(control site)
Exp 13 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Dynamic level management. Governance
innovation
Exp 14 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Flexible groundwater irrigation. Governance
innovation
Exp 15 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Multifunctional land use/shared
responsibility. Technical and governance
innovation
Exp 16 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Multifunctional land use. Technical
innovation
Exp 17 Coastal management/sea-level rise Building with nature. Technical innovation
Exp 18 Water variability/increase in flooding or
drought risk
Multifunctional land use. Technical
innovation
Appendix 3
The table notes survey responses for each experiment (Mun. = municipality;
W.A. = water authority; Prov. = province; Min. = Ministry for Environment)








Municipality W.A. Prov. Min.
1 (T) 9 5 4 7 7 7 7
2 (B) 9 9 6 7 7
3 (A) 10 4 4 7
4 (A) 8 6 5 7 7
5 (A) 11 9 9 7 7 7
6 (T) 9 5 4 7 7
7 (B) 11 4 1 7
8 (B) 4 1 0 7
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Municipality W.A. Prov. Min.
9 (A) 11 2 2 7 7
10 (B) 11 8 4 7 7 7
11 (T) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
12 (T) 12 8 5 7 7 7
13 (B) 10 5 4 7
14 (A) 7 6 5 7 7 7
15 (A) 9 8 5 7 7
16 (A) 10 6 6 7 7 7
17 (T) 16 4 4 7 7
Total (ave) 164 97 (60%) 75 (48%) 10 16 10 3
Appendix 4
Survey questions and breakdown of answers into ideal types:
1. Credibility
The questions were answered on a scale ranging from: (1) no certainly not; (2) not
really; (3) neutral; (4) somewhat; and (5) certainly.
A: Are the findings reliable enough to base policy decisions on?
B: Are the conclusions of the initiators of the experiment well substantiated?
C: Did the experiment produce reliable data?
D: Did the experiment address a clear question or problem?
E: In your opinion, was the experiment well structured?
F: Was the experiment conducted by reliable parties?
G: Did you have confidence in the ability of the scientists/technical experts who were
involved in the experiment?
• Graph to show how the ideal types differ for each question measuring credibility.
Average = 4.1:











Kruskal–Wallis tests for significance between indicators:
Indicator Significance Decision
A .352 Retain the null hypothesis
B .086 Retain the null hypothesis
C .129 Retain the null hypothesis
D .009 Reject the null hypothesis
E .078 Retain the null hypothesis
F .777 Retain the null hypothesis
G .008 Reject the null hypothesis
2. Salience
A: The experiment delayed rather than accelerated policy development
B: Communication of the results of the experiment did not meet the experiences of
policy makers
C: At first the experiment addressed questions raised by policy makers, but now there are
new questions
D: The experiment is primarily linked to the interest of experts and not policy makers
E: The experiment produced results that can be converted directly into policy
F: The results of the experiment were communicated clearly, so that policy makers can
utilise them
G: The experiment provides substantial opportunities for policy renewal
H: The experiment fits in well with the knowledge gaps that exist amongst policymakers
I: The experiment is about a matter of public interest in my area
• Graph to show how the ideal types differ for each statement measuring salience.
Average = 3.6:













Kruskal–Wallis tests for significance between indicators:
Indicator Significance Decision
A .210 Retain the null hypothesis
B .218 Retain the null hypothesis
C .008 Reject the null hypothesis
D .002 Reject the null hypothesis
E .027 Reject the null hypothesis
F .560 Retain the null hypothesis
G .171 Retain the null hypothesis
H .270 Retain the null hypothesis
I .040 Reject the null hypothesis
3. Legitimacy
A: Are the goals of the experiment representative of the values existing in the
surrounding community?
B: Do you think the organisers of the experiment ensured a sufficient degree of
openness?
C: Does the new approach tested in the experiment reflect the views and priorities of
people that live in the area?
D: Are the perspectives of participants in the experiment treated with respect?
E: According to you, did the organisers involve in the experiment all parties with
affected interests?
(Open question respondents were directed to if they answered E negatively):
You indicated in the previous question that not all parties with interests in the
experiment were involved. Can you specify which parties or interests were
overlooked?
Graph to show how the ideal types differ from each question measuring legitimacy.
Average = 3.8:









Kruskal–Wallis tests for significance between indicators:
Indicator Significance Decision
A .353 Retain the null hypothesis
B .013 Reject the null hypothesis
C .022 Reject the null hypothesis
D .004 Reject the null hypothesis
E .012 Reject the null hypothesis
Appendix 5
Statistics for each impact indicator (dependent variable).
1. Levene’s test of variance results
Test of homogeneity of variances
Levene statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Credibility 1.724 2 66 .186
Salience .516 2 68 .599




Dependent variable Mean difference (I - J) Std. error Sig. 95% Confidence interval
Lower bound Upper bound
Credibility
Technocratic
Boundary -.59793* .21368 .018 -1.1103 -.0856
Advocacy -.23082 .16727 .357 -.6319 .1702
Boundary
Technocratic .59793* .21368 .018 .0856 1.1103
Advocacy .36711 .20165 .171 -.1164 .8506
Advocacy
Technocratic .23082 .16727 .357 -.1702 .6319
Boundary -.36711 .20165 .171 -.8506 .1164
Salience
Technocratic
Boundary -.39981 .18495 .085 -.8430 .0433
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